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WOODFIN v. COMMONWEALTH
__ Va. , S.E.2d __ (1988)
(Va. September 23, 1988)
(WESTLAW, Set library)
FACTS
On October 24, 1984, at approximately 8:45 p.m., Susan
Hall and Frank Gabbin were shot and killed in their residence
at 111 Strawberry Street in Richmond. Empty cartridges were
found at the scene. A witness saw and identified defendant in-
side the front door of the residence at 8:50 p.m. Evidence of
other shootings by Woodfin, admitted over objection but ap-
proved by the court in this opinion, established that a weapon
recovered two days after the killings was the murder weapon.
Kenneth Woodfm was found guilty of capital murder of
Hall, murder of Gabbin, and use of a firearm in the killings.
He was sentenced to life terms for capital murder and first-
degree murder, and terms of specific years for the firearms
charges.
Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Virginia because
Woodfin challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of the
Virginia statute defining capital murder, §18.2-31.
HOLDING
a) Constitutionality of Virginia code §18.2-31.
First, the court, in an opinion by Justice Compton, declined
to address the general facial statutory challenge because the
defendant did not allege that his conduct was constitutionally
protected or that the statute affected his First Amendment
rights. Instead, the court narrowed the question to "whether §
8.2-31(g) is vague as applied to the defendant's conduct in this
case." Woodfin v. Commonwealth, No. 880244 1, 3 (Va. Sept.
23, 1988) (WESTLAW, Set library). Virginia Code § 18.2-31(g)
provides that capital murder is the willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the
same act or transaction. The court stated the general law that
"a penal statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute and if the enactment encourages selec-
tive law enforcement." Id, quoting Flannery v. City of Norfolk,
216 Va. 362, 218 S.E.2d 730 (1975). Not finding anything
"uncertain or ambiguous" in the language of the statute, the
court stated that "defendent reasonably should have been on
notice that the statute applied to his actions," Woodfin, No.
880244 at 4. The court defended the statute's purpose as
penalizing two offenses that "are connected so closely 'in time,
place and circumstance that a complete account of one charge
cannot be related without relating details of the other charge.'
State v. Fitzgerald, 267 Or. 266, 273, 516 P.2d 1280, 1284
(1973)." Id.
c) Double jeopardy.
The defendant argued that the court punished him twice for
the same offense of killing Frank Gabbin when it imposed a life
sentence for the murder of Gabbin and a life sentence for the
capital murder of Hall under Virginia Code §18.2-31(g). The
gist of the argument is that the murder of Gabbin was used
twice in the punishment of Woodfin, once as a first degree
murder and once to elevate the killing of Hall to capital
murder.
The court acknowledged the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' protection against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense as preventing the court from exceeding the legislative
authorization which defines separate offenses. Id., at 10. The
court quoted Turner v. Commonwealth, which found the
General Assembly had "clearly indicated its intent to impose
multiple punishments." Turner v. Commonwealth 221 Va. 513,
530, 273 S.E.2d 36, 47 (1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1011
(1981). Woodfin, No. 880244 at 10. The court stated that it
could not "say that [in passing the capital murder statute] the
legislature intended the elimination of underlying sentencing
authority for murder of the first degree." Id., at 10-11. The
court categorized the sentences as "a life sentence for the killing
of Hall and a life sentence for the killing of Gabbin, not two
life sentences for the killing of Gabbin," Id. So, the murder of
Gabbin was used twice in the punishment of Woodf'm, but the
court found that this is not in violation of the protection
against multiple punishments because the legislature intended
this result when it wrote the statute.
ANALYSIS
The Virginia Supreme Court only considered vagueness of
the statute on a case-by-case basis, thereby leaving open future
litigation on the matter of its constitutionality as a whole.
The court found that Virginia Code §18.2-31(g) making it a
capital offense to kill more than one person as part of the same
act or transaction is not a multiple punishment when combined
with punishment for the killing of the other person. An accused
may be punished both for the killing of one person and for the
capital offense of killing more than one person. The court
found the legislative intent to be gradation.
The court, in analyzing the vagueness claim, conducted a
Fourteenth Amendment "notice" analysis-notice to persons of
the punishment for their actions. In Maynard v. Cartwright,
108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58 (1987), the United States Supreme
Court found a similar analysis of the "vileness" aggravating
factor by Oklahoma's Supreme Court to be erroneous. The
Court held the proper vagueness test to be that of the Eighth
Amendment-directed toward the jury-to inform juries what
they must find to impose the death penalty. Id., at 1858.
Reconciliation of Woodfin and Maynard revolves around the
significance of the fact that Maynard dealt with an aggravating
sentencing factor, while Woodfin deals with an aggravator in-
eluded in the definition of capital murder. (Helen Bishop)
